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Abstract. Detecting fake users (also called Sybils) in online social net-
works is a basic security research problem. State-of-the-art approaches
rely on a large amount of manually labeled users as a training set. These
approaches suffer from three key limitations: 1) it is time-consuming and
costly to manually label a large training set, 2) they cannot detect new
Sybils in a timely fashion, and 3) they are vulnerable to Sybil attacks that
leverage information of the training set. In this work, we propose Sybil-
Blind, a structure-based Sybil detection framework that does not rely on
a manually labeled training set. SybilBlind works under the same threat
model as state-of-the-art structure-based methods. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of SybilBlind using 1) a social network with synthetic Sybils
and 2) two Twitter datasets with real Sybils. For instance, SybilBlind
achieves an AUC of 0.98 on a Twitter dataset.
Keywords: Sybil Detection · Social Networks Security.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are known to be vulnerable to Sybil attacks, in
which attackers maintain a large number of fake users (also called Sybils). For
instance, 10% of Twitter users were fake [1]. Attackers can leverage Sybils to per-
form various malicious activities such as manipulating presidential election [15],
influencing stock market [16], distributing spams and phishing URLs [24], etc..
Therefore, Sybil detection in OSNs is an important research problem.
Indeed, Sybil detection has attracted increasing attention from multiple re-
search communities such as security, networking, and data mining. Among vari-
ous approaches, structure-based ones [39,38,8,26,37,7,33,36,6,14,11,30,18,28] have
demonstrated promising results. For instance, SybilRank [7] and Integro [6] were
deployed to detect a large amount of Sybils in Tuenti, the largest OSN in Spain.
SybilSCAR [30] was shown to be effective and efficient in detecting Sybils in
Twitter. State-of-the-art structure-based approaches adopt the following ma-
chine learning paradigm: they first require an OSN provider to collect a large
manually labeled training set consisting of labeled benign users and/or labeled
Sybils; then they learn a model to distinguish between benign users and Sybils;
finally, the model is used to detect Sybils.
? The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
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Such paradigm of relying on a manually labeled training set suffers from three
key limitations. First, it is time-consuming and costly to obtain a large manu-
ally labeled training set. We note that OSN providers could outsource manual
labeling to crowdsourcing services like Amazon Mechanical Turk [32]. However,
crowdsourcing manual labeling requires disclosing user information to “turkers”,
which raises privacy concerns. Moreover, attackers could act as “turkers” to ad-
versarially mislabel users. OSNs often allow users to flag other users as Sybils.
However, similar to crowdsourcing, Sybils could adversarially mislabel benign
users as Sybils. Second, attackers can launch new Sybil attacks when the old
ones were taken down. It takes time for human workers to manually label a
training set for the new attacks. As a result, some benign users might already be
attacked before the new attacks were detected. Third, using a manually labeled
training set makes these approaches vulnerable to Sybil attacks that leverage the
information of the training set [21]. The key intuition is that once an attacker
knows or infers the training set, he can perform better attacks over time. Our
method is secure against such attacks as it does not rely on labeled users.
Our work: In this work, we propose SybilBlind, a structure-based framework,
to detect Sybils without relying on a manually labeled training set, under the
same threat model as state-of-the-art structure-based methods (See Section 3.2).
Our key idea is to sample some users from an OSN, randomly assign labels (i.e.,
benign or Sybil) to them, and treat them as if they were a training set without
actually manually labeling them. Such randomly sampled training set could have
various levels of label noise, where a user’s randomly assigned label is noisy if
it is different from the user’s true label. Then, we take the noisy training set
as an input to a state-of-the-art Sybil detection method (e.g., SybilSCAR [30]
in our experiments) that is relatively robust to label noise (i.e., performance
does not degrade much with a relatively low fraction of noisy labels) to detect
Sybils. We define a sampling trial as the process that we randomly sample a
noisy training set and use a state-of-the-art Sybil detection method to detect
Sybils via taking the sampled training set as an input. Since state-of-the-art
Sybil detection methods can only accurately detect Sybils in the sampling trials
where the sampled training sets have relatively low label noise, we repeat for
multiple sampling trials and we design an aggregator to aggregate the results in
the multiple sampling trials.
A key challenge of our SybilBlind framework is how to aggregate the results
in multiple sampling trials. For instance, one natural aggregator is to average
the results in multiple sampling trials. Specifically, in each sampling trial, we
have a probability of being a Sybil for each user. We average the probabilities
over multiple sampling trials for each user and use the averaged probability to
classify a user to be benign or Sybil. However, we demonstrate, both theoret-
ically and empirically, that such average aggregator achieves an accuracy that
is close to random guessing. To address the aggregation challenge, we design a
novel aggregator. Specifically, we design two new metrics called homophily and
one-side entropy. In a sampling trial where Sybils are accurately detected, both
homophily and one-side entropy are large. With the two metrics, our aggregator
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identifies the sampling trials in which the sampled training sets have low label
noise and Sybils are accurately detected. Then, we compute an aggregated prob-
ability of being a Sybil for every user from these sampling trials and use the
aggregated probabilities to detect Sybils.
We evaluate SybilBlind both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we
analyze the required number of sampling trials. Empirically, we perform evalua-
tions using 1) a social network with synthesized Sybils, 2) a small Twitter dataset
(8K users and 68K edges) with real Sybils, and 3) a large Twitter dataset (42M
users and 1.2B edges) with real Sybils. Our results demonstrate that SybilBlind
is accurate, e.g., on the small Twitter dataset, SybilBlind achieves an AUC of
0.98. Moreover, we adapt a community detection method and state-of-the-art
Sybil detection method SybilSCAR [30] to detect Sybils when a manually la-
beled training set is unavailable. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that
SybilBlind substantially outperforms these adapted methods.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose SybilBlind, a structure-based framework, to detect Sybils in
OSNs without relying on a manually labeled training set.
• We design a novel aggregator based on homophily and one-side entropy
to aggregate results in multiple sampling trials.
• We evaluate SybilBlind both theoretically and empirically, as well as com-
pare it with Sybil detection methods that we adapt to detect Sybils when
no manually labeled training sets are available. Our empirical results
demonstrate the superiority of SybilBlind over the adapted methods.
2 Related Work
2.1 Structure-based Approaches
One category of Sybil detection approaches leverage the global structure of the
social network [39,38,8,26,37,7,33,36,6,14,9,11,30,18,28,29]. These approaches re-
quire a manually labeled training dataset, from which they propagate label in-
formation among the social network via leveraging the social structure.
Using random walks or Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP): Many structure-
based approaches [39,38,8,7,36,6,18] leverage random walks to propagate label
information. SybilGuard [39], SybilLimit [38], and SybilInfer [8] only require
one labeled benign user. However, they achieve limited performance and are not
scalable to large-scale OSNs. SybilRank [7] and I´ntegro [6] are state-of-the-art
random walk based approaches, and they were successfully applied to detect a
large amount of Sybils in Tuenti, the largest OSN in Spain. However, they re-
quire a large number of manually labeled benign users; and I´ntegro even further
requires a large number of labeled victims and non-victims, which were used to
learn a binary victim-prediction classifier. A user is said to be a victim if the
user is connected with at least a Sybil. SybilBelief [14], Fu et al. [9], GANG [28],
and SybilFuse [11] leverage probabilistic graphical model techniques. Specifi-
cally, they model a social network as a pairwise Markov Random Fields. Given
a training dataset, they leverage LBP to infer the label of each remaining user.
4 Binghui Wang, Le Zhang, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Recently, Wang et al. [30,29] proposed a local rule based framework to unify
random walk and LBP based approaches. Under this framework, a structure-
based Sybil detection method essentially iteratively applies a certain local rule
to each user to propagate label information. Different Sybil detection methods
use different local rules. Moreover, they also proposed a new local rule, based
on which they designed SybilSCAR that achieves state-of-the-art performance
both theoretically and empirically. For instance, SybilSCAR achieves the tightest
asymptotic bound on the number of Sybils per attack edge that can be injected
into a social network without being detected [29]. However, as we demonstrate
in our experiments on Twitter, SybilSCAR requires a large training dataset in
order to achieve an accurate Sybil detection performance.
Using community detection algorithms: Viswanath et al. [26] showed that
Sybil detection can be cast as a community detection problem. The authors found
that detecting local community around a labeled benign user had equivalent
results to approaches such as SybilLimit and SybilInfer. Cao et al. [7] showed that
SybilRank significantly outperforms community detection approaches. Moreover,
Alvisi et al. [2] demonstrated a vulnerability of the local community detection
algorithm adopted by Viswanath et al. [26] by carefully designing an attack.
Summary: State-of-the-art structure-based approaches (e.g., SybilRank, Sybil-
Belief, and SybilSCAR) require a large manually labeled training dataset. These
approaches suffer from three key limitations as we discussed in Introduction.
2.2 Other Approaches
Approaches in this direction [27,23,4,35,19,37,24,10,31,22] leverage various user-
generated contents (e.g., tweets), behaviors (e.g., the frequency of sending tweets),
and local social structures (e.g., how a user’s friends are connected). Most studies
in this direction [27,23,4,24,10,22] treat Sybil detection as a supervised learning
problem; they extract various features from user-generated contents, behaviors,
and local social structures, and they learn machine learning classifiers using a
training dataset; the learnt classifiers are then used to classify each remaining
user to be benign or Sybil. For instance, Yang et al. [37] proposed local social
structure based features such as the frequency that a user sends friend requests
to others, the fraction of outgoing friend requests that are accepted, and the
clustering coefficient of a user. One limitation of these approaches is that Sybils
can manipulate users’ profiles to evade detection. For instance, a Sybil can link
to many Sybils to manipulate its local social structure as desired. However, al-
though these approaches are easy to evade, we believe that they can be used as
a first layer to filter some basic Sybils and increase attackers’ costs of perform-
ing Sybil attacks. Moreover, these approaches are complementary to approaches
that leverage global social structures, and they can be used together in practice.
For instance, we can treat the outputs of these approaches as users’ prior prob-
abilities. Then, we can leverage structure-based methods, e.g., SybilSCAR [30],
to detect Sybils by iteratively propagating the priors among a social network.
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3 Problem Definition
3.1 Structure-based Sybil Detection without Manual Labels
Suppose we are given an undirected social network G = (V,E),1 where a node
in V corresponds to a user in an OSN and an edge (u, v) represents a certain
relationship between u and v. For instance, on Facebook, an edge between u and
v could mean that u is in v’s friend list and vice versa. On Twitter, an edge
(u, v) could mean that u and v follow each other. We consider Sybil detection
without a manually labeled training dataset, which we call blind Sybil detection.
Definition 1 (Blind Sybil Detection). Suppose we are given a social net-
work. Blind Sybil detection is to classify each node to be benign or Sybil without
a manually labeled training dataset.
3.2 Threat Model
We call the subnetwork containing all benign nodes and edges between them the
benign region, and we call the subnetwork containing all Sybil nodes and edges
between them the Sybil region. The edges between the two regions are called
attack edges. We consider the following threat model, which is widely adopted
by existing structure-based methods.
Connected-Sybil attacks: We consider that Sybils are connected among
themselves. In order to leverage Sybils to launch various malicious activities,
an attacker often needs to first link his/her created Sybils to benign users. One
attack strategy is that each Sybil aggressively sends friend requests to a large
number of users (or follow a large number of users) that are randomly picked [37].
In these attacks, although some benign users (e.g., social capitalists [12]) will
accept such friend requests with a relatively high probability, making the Sybils
embed to the benign region, most benign users will not accept these friend re-
quests [12]. As a result, Sybils that are created using this attack strategy often
have low ratios of accepted friend requests (or ratios of being followed back), as
well as low clustering coefficients because most users that link to a Sybil might
not be connected with each other. Therefore, such Sybils can be detected by
machine learning classifiers that use these structural features, as was shown by
Yang et al. [37] on RenRen, a large OSN in China.
In this paper, we consider that Sybils created by an attacker are connected
(i.e., connected-Sybil attack), so as to manipulate their structural features to
evade the detection of structural feature based classifiers. Such connected-Sybil
attacks were formally discussed by Alvisi et al. [2], are required by previous
structure-based methods [39,38,8,26,7,36,6,14,30,33]. Note that Sybils in Tuenti [7],
the largest OSN in Spain, are densely connected. Moreover, the datasets we used
in our experiments also show that most of the Sybils are connected. For instance,
in our large Twitter dataset, 85.3% Sybils are connected to form a largest con-
nected component with an average degree 24.
1 Our framework can also be generalized to directed social networks.
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Limited number of attack edges: Intuitively, most benign users would not
establish trust relationships with Sybils. We assume that the number of attack
edges is relatively smaller, compared to the number of edges in the benign region
and the Sybil region. This assumption is required by all previous structure-
based methods [39,38,8,26,7,36,6,14,30,33] except I´ntegro [6]. I´ntegro assumes
the number of victims (a victim is a node having attack edges) is small and
victims can be accurately detected. The number of attack edges in Tuenti was
shown to be relatively small [7]. Service providers can limit the number of attack
edges via approximating trust relationships between users, e.g., looking into
user interactions [34], inferring tie strengths [13], and asking users to rate their
social friends [33]. We note that in the large Twitter dataset we used in our
experiments, only 1.5% of the total edges are attack edges.
For connected-Sybil attacks, limited number of attack edges is equivalent to
the homophily assumption, i.e., if we randomly sample an edge (u, v) from the
social network, then u and v have the same label with high probability. In the
following, we use homophily and limited number of attack edges interchangeably.
Benign users are more than Sybils: We assume that Sybils are less than
benign users in the OSN. An attacker often leverages only tens of thousands
of compromised hosts to create and manage Sybils [25]. If an attacker registers
and maintains a large number of Sybils on each compromised host, the OSN
provider can easily detect these Sybils via IP-based methods. In other words, to
evade detection by IP-based methods, each compromised host can only maintain
a limited number of Sybils. Indeed, Thomas et al. [25] found that a half of
compromised hosts under an attacker’s control maintain less than 10 Sybils. As
a result, in OSNs with tens or hundreds of millions of benign users, the number
of Sybils is smaller than that of benign users. For instance, it was reported that
10% of Twitter users were Sybils [1]. Our method leverages this assumption to
break the symmetry between the benign region and the Sybil region.
4 Design of SybilBlind
4.1 Overview
Figure 1 overviews SybilBlind. SybilBlind consists of three components, i.e.,
sampler, detector, and homophily-entropy aggregator (HEA). Sampler samples
two subsets of nodes from the social network, and constructs a training set by
assigning a label of benign to nodes in one subset and a label of Sybil to nodes
in the other subset. The detector takes the sampled noisy training set as an
input and produces a probability of being Sybil for each node. The detector
can be any structure-based Sybil detection method (e.g., SybilSCAR [30] in
our experiments) that is relatively robust to label noise in the training set.
SybilBlind repeats this sampling process for multiple trials, and it leverages
a homophily-entropy aggregator to identify the sampling trials in which the
detector accurately detects Sybils. Finally, SybilBlind computes an aggregated
probability of being Sybil for every node using the identified sampling trials.
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Fig. 1: Overview of SybilBlind.
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Fig. 2: Three scenarios of our sampled
nodes with a sampling size 3.
4.2 Sampler
In each sampling trial, our sampler samples two subsets of nodes from the set of
nodes V , which are denoted as B and S, respectively. Moreover, for simplicity,
we consider the two subsets have the same number of nodes, i.e., n = |B| = |S|,
and we call n the sampling size. We note that it would be a valuable future work
to apply our SybilBlind framework to subsets B and S with different sizes.
The subset B (or S) might consist of both benign nodes and Sybils. For
convenience, we denote by nbb and nbs respectively the number of benign nodes
and the number of Sybils in B; and we denote by nsb and nss respectively
the number of benign nodes and the number of Sybils in S. We categorize the
sampled nodes into three scenarios because they have different impacts on the
performance of the detector. Figure 2 shows one example of the three scenarios,
where n = 3. The three scenarios are as follows:
• Positively polarized: In this scenario, the number of benign nodes in
B is larger than the number of benign nodes in S, while the number of
Sybils in B is smaller than the number of Sybils in S. Formally, we have
nbb > nsb and nbs < nss.
• Negatively polarized: In this scenario, B includes a smaller number
of benign nodes than S, while B includes a larger number of Sybils than
S. Formally, we have nbb < nsb and nbs > nss.
• Unpolarized: In this scenario, the number of benign (or Sybil) nodes in
B equals the number of benign (or Sybil) nodes in S. Formally, we have
nbb = nsb and nbs = nss.
Note that since the two subsets B and S have the same number of nodes,
we only have the above three scenarios. We construct a training set using the
sampled B and S. Specifically, we assign a label of benign to nodes in B and a
label of Sybil to nodes in S. Such training set could have label noise. In particular,
in a sampling trial that is positively polarized, a majority of sampled nodes are
assigned labels that match their true labels; while in a sampling trial that is
negatively polarized, a majority of sampled nodes are assigned labels that do
not match their true labels.
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4.3 Detector
The detector takes a (noisy) training set as an input and produces a probability
of being Sybil for every node (including the sampled nodes in the training set).
The requirement for the detector is to be relatively robust to label noise in
the training set. In this work, we adopt SybilSCAR [30] as the detector as it
was shown to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy and robustness to label noise.
However, we stress that our framework is extensible to use other structure-based
Sybil detection methods as the detector. In particular, if a better structure-based
Sybil detection method that uses a manually labeled training set is designed in
the future, we can use it as the detector to further improve SybilBlind.
Next, we briefly review SybilSCAR. Given the sampled training set, SybilSCAR
assigns a prior probability qu of being Sybil for every node u. Specifically,
qu =

0.5 + θ if u ∈ S
0.5− θ if u ∈ B
0.5 otherwise,
where 0 < θ < 0.5 is a parameter to consider label noise.
Given the priors, SybilSCAR iteratively computes the probability pu of being
Sybil for every node u until convergence. Specifically, initially we have p
(0)
u = qu.
In the tth iteration, for each node u, we have:
p(t)u = qu + 2(w − 0.5)
∑
v∈Γ (u)
(p(t−1)v − 0.5), (1)
where w ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that two linked nodes have the same label and
Γ (u) is the set of neighbors of u.
4.4 Homophily-Entropy Aggregator
SybilBlind repeats k sampling trials, each of which produces a probability of be-
ing Sybil for every node. We denote the k probabilities for u as p1,u, p2,u, · · · , pk,u.
An aggregator is to reduce the k probabilities to an aggregated probability.
Average, min, and max aggregators do not work well: average, min, and
max aggregators are a few natural choices. Specifically, the average aggregator
takes the average of the k probabilities to be the aggregated one; the min aggre-
gator is to take the minimum value of the k probabilities, i.e., pu = min
k
i=1 pi,u;
the max aggregator is to take the maximum value of the k probabilities, i.e.,
pu = max
k
i=1 pi,u. However, we demonstrated, theoretically and empirically, that
these aggregators achieve performances that are the same with or even worse
than random guessing. In particular, for the average aggregator, we can prove
that the expected aggregated probability is 0.5 for every node when the detec-
tor is SybilSCAR, which means that the expected performance of the average
aggregator is the same as random guessing. We show the proof in Appendix A.
Our homophily-entropy aggregator (HEA): We propose a novel aggrega-
tor based on two new metrics that we call homophily and one-side entropy. We
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observe that, when a sampling trial is a highly positively polarized scenario in
which a majority of nodes in B are benign and a majority of nodes in S are Sybils,
SybilSCAR can detect Sybils accurately. Our HEA aggregator aims to identify
such sampling trials and use them to determine the aggregated probabilities.
Next, we first formally define our homophily and one-side entropy metrics.
Suppose in a sampling trial, SybilSCAR produces a probability of being Sybil
for every node. We predict a node u to be Sybil if pu > 0.5, otherwise we predict
u to be benign. Moreover, we denote by s the fraction of nodes in the social
network that are predicted to be Sybils. An edge (u, v) in the social network is
said to be homogeneous if u and v have the same predicted label. Given these
terms, we formally define homophily h and one-side entropy e as follows:
h =
#homogeneous edges
#edges in total
e =
{
0 if s > 0.5
−slog(s)− (1− s)log(1− s) otherwise (2)
Intuitively, homophily is the fraction of edges that are predicted to be homoge-
neous. One-side entropy is small if too many or too few nodes are predicted to be
Sybils. In our threat model, we consider that the fraction of Sybils in the social
network is less than 50%. Therefore, we define one-side entropy to be 0 if more
than a half of nodes are predicted to be Sybils. Note the difference between our
defined one-side entropy and the conventional entropy in information theory.
In a sampling trial that is an unpolarized scenario, we expect the homophily
to be small because SybilSCAR tends to predict labels for nodes randomly. In a
sampling trial that is a negatively polarized scenario, we expect the homophily
to be large because a majority of benign nodes are likely to be predicted to be
Sybils and a majority of Sybils are likely to be predicted to be benign, which
results in a large fraction of homogeneous edges. However, we expect the one-side
entropy to be small because more than a half of nodes would be predicted to be
Sybils. In a sampling trial that is a positively polarized scenario, we expect both
homophily and one-side entropy to be large.
Therefore, our HEA aggregator aims to identify the sampling trials that have
large homophily and one-side entropy. In particular, we first identify the top-κ
sampling trials among the k sampling trials that have the largest homophily.
Then, among the top-κ sampling trials, we choose the sampling trial with the
largest one-side entropy and use the probability obtained in this sampling trial
as the aggregated probability. Essentially, among the top-κ sampling trials, we
identify the sampling trial with the largest s that is no larger than 0.5, i.e., we
aim to use the sampling trial that detects the most Sybils. Note that we can
also reverse the order by first identifying the top-κ sampling trials that have
the largest one-side entropies and choose the sampling trial with the largest
homophily. However, we find the performance is almost the same and we thus
use the former way by default.
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5 Theoretical Analysis
5.1 Sampling Size and Number of Sampling Trials
The sampler constructs a training set via assigning a label of benign to nodes in
B and a label of Sybil to nodes in S. We define label noise in the benign region
(denoted as αb) as the fraction of sampled nodes in the benign region whose
assigned labels are Sybil. Similarly, we define label noise in the Sybil region
(denoted as αs) as the fraction of sampled nodes in the Sybil region whose
assigned labels are benign. Formally, we have αb =
nsb
nsb+nbb
and αs =
nbs
nbs+nss
,
where nbb and nbs respectively are the number of benign nodes and Sybils in B;
nsb and nss respectively are the number of benign nodes and Sybils in S.
We can derive an analytical form for the probability that label noise in both
the benign region and the Sybil region are smaller than a threshold τ in a
sampling trial. Due to limited space, we omit the analytical form. However,
the analytical form is too complex to illustrate the relationships between the
sampling size and the number of sampling trials. Therefore, we show the following
theorem, which bounds the probability.
Theorem 1. In a sampling trial with a sampling size of n, the probability that
label noise in both the benign region and the Sybil region are no bigger than τ
(τ ≤ 0.5) is bounded as
(1− r)nrn ≤ Pr(αb ≤ τ, αs ≤ τ) ≤ exp
(− 2(1− 2τ)2(1− r)2n
τ2 + (1− τ)2
)
, (3)
where r is the fraction of Sybils in the social network.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Implications of Theorem 1: Suppose in a social network, SybilSCAR is
robust to label noise upto τ , i.e., its performance almost does not degrade when
the noise level is τ , then SybilBlind requires at least one sampling trial, in which
the label noise is less than or equal to τ , to detect Sybils accurately. We have
several qualitative implications from Theorem 1. We note that these implications
also hold when using the analytical form of the probability that label noise are
smaller than τ . Here, we choose Theorem 1 because of its conciseness.
First, when the sampling size is n and SybilSCAR is robust to label noise
up to τ in the social network, the expected number of sampling trials (i.e.,
k) that SybilBlind requires is bounded as kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax, where kmin =
exp
( 2(1−2τ)2(1−r)2n
τ2+(1−τ)2
)
and kmax =
1
(1−r)nrn . Note that kmin is exponential with
respect to n, which could be very large even if n is moderate. However, through
empirical evaluations, we found k can be largely reduced and a moderate k could
make SybilBlind obtain satisfying performance. Second, when τ gets bigger, kmin
gets smaller, which implies that SybilBlind tends to require less sampling trials
when detecting Sybils in a social network in which SybilSCAR can tolerate larger
label noise. Third, we observe a scale-free property, i.e., the number of sampling
trials is not related to the size (i.e., |V | or |E|) of the social network.
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5.2 Complexity Analysis
Space and time complexity: The major space cost of SybilBlind consists of
storing the social network and storing the top-κ vectors of posterior probabilities.
SybilBlind uses an adjacency list to represent the social network, with the space
complexity O(2|E|), and stores the top-κ vectors of posterior probabilities of all
nodes. Therefore, the space complexity of SybilBlind is O(2|E|+ κ|V |).
In each trial and in each iteration, SybilBlind applies a local rule to every
node, and the time complexity of the local rule to a node u with |Γu| friends is
O(|Γu|). Therefore, the time complexity of SybilBlind in one iteration is O(|E|).
Since SybilBlind performs k sampling trials and each trial runs T iterations, it
thus has a time complexity of O(kT |E|).
Two-level parallel implementation: We can have a two-level parallel imple-
mentation of SybilBlind on a data center which is a standard backend for social
web services. First, different sampling trials can be run on different machines.
They only need to communicate once to share their vectors of posterior proba-
bilities. Second, each machine can parallelize SybilSCAR using multithreading.
Specifically, in each iteration of SybilSCAR, each thread applies the local rule
to a subset of nodes in the social network.
6 Experiments
6.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets: We use social networks with synthesized Sybils and Twitter datasets
with real Sybils for evaluations. Table 1 summarizes the datasets.
1) Social networks with synthesized Sybils. Following previous works
[38,8,7], we use a real-world social network as the benign region, while synthesiz-
ing the Sybil region and attack edges. Specifically, we take a Facebook network
as the benign region; we synthesize the Sybil region using the Preferential At-
tachment (PA) model [3], which is a widely used method to generate networks;
and we add attack edges between the benign region and the Sybil region uni-
formly at random. In this graph, nodes are Facebook users and two nodes are
connected if they are friends. We synthesize the Sybil region such that 20% of
users in the social network are Sybils; the average degree in the Sybil region is
the same as that in the benign region in order to avoid asymmetry between the
two regions introduced by density. We set the number of attack edges as 500,
and thus the average attack edge per Sybil is 0.06.
2) Small Twitter with real Sybils. We obtained a publicly available
Twitter dataset with 809 Sybils and 7,358 benign nodes from Yang et al. [36]. A
node is a Twitter user and an edge means two users follow each other. Sybils were
labeled spammers. 9.9% of nodes are Sybils and 53.4% of Sybils are connected.
The average degree is 16.72, and the average attack edge per Sybil is 49.46.
3) Large Twitter with real Sybils. We obtained a snapshot of a large-
scale Twitter follower-followee network crawled by Kwak et al. [20]. A node is
a Twitter user and an edge between two nodes means that one node follows
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Table 1: Dataset statistics.
Metric Facebook Small Twitter Large Twitter
#Nodes 43,953 8,167 41,652,230
#Edges 182,384 68,282 1,202,513,046
Ave. degree 8.29 16.72 57.74
Ave. #attack edge per Sybil 0.06 49.46 181.55
the other node. The network has 41,652,230 nodes and 1,202,513,046 edges. To
perform evaluation, we need ground truth labels of the nodes. Since the Twitter
network includes users’ Twitter IDs, we wrote a crawler to visit each user’s profile
using Twitter’s API, which tells us the status (i.e., active, suspended, or deleted)
of each user. In our ground truth, 205,355 nodes were suspended, 5,289,966 nodes
were deleted, and the remaining 36,156,909 nodes are active. We take suspended
users as Sybils and active users as benign nodes. 85.3% Sybils are connected with
an average degree 24. 1.5% of the total edges are attack edges and the average
number of attack edges per Sybil is 181.55. We acknowledge that our ground
truth labels might be noisy since some active users might be Sybils, but they
evaded Twitter’s detection, and Twitter might have deleted some Sybils.
AUC as an evaluation metric: Similar to previous studies [7,6,14,30], we
use the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) as an
evaluation metric. Suppose we rank nodes according to their probabilities of be-
ing Sybil in a descending order. AUC is the probability that a randomly selected
Sybil ranks higher than a randomly selected benign node. Random guessing,
which ranks nodes uniformly at random, achieves an AUC of 0.5.
Compared methods: We adapt a community detection method and SybilSCAR
to detect Sybils when no manual labels are available. Moreover, we compare with
SybilRank [7] and SybilBelief [14] that require manual labels.
1) Community detection (Louvain Method). When there are no man-
ually labeled training sets, community detection seems to be a natural choice
to detect connected Sybils.2 A community detection method divides a social
network into connected components (called “communities”), where nodes in the
same community are densely connected while nodes across different communities
are loosely connected. Presumably, Sybils are in the same communities.
Since the benign region itself often consists of multiple communities [7,2],
the key challenge of community detection methods is how to determine which
communities correspond to Sybils. Assigning a label of Sybil (or benign) to a
community means that all nodes in the community are Sybils (or benign). Since
it is unclear how to assign labels to the communities algorithmically (though
one could try various heuristics), in our experiments, we assume one could label
communities such that community detection achieves a false negative rate that
is the closest to that of SybilBlind. Specifically, SybilBlind predicts a node to be
Sybil if its aggregated probability is larger than 0.5, and thus we can compute
2 The local community detection method [26] requires labeled benign nodes and thus
is inapplicable to detect Sybils without a manually labeled training set.
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the false negative rate for SybilBlind. Then we compare community detection
with SybilBlind with respect to AUC, via ranking the communities labeled as
Sybil higher than those labeled as benign. Our experiments give advantages to
community detection since this label assignment might not be found in practice.
Louvain method [5] is a widely used community detection method, which is effi-
cient and outperforms a variety of community detection methods [5]. Therefore,
we choose Louvain method in our experiments.
2) SybilSCAR with a sampled noisy training set (SybilSCAR-Adapt).
When a manually labeled training set is unavailable, we use our sampler to sam-
ple a training set and treat it as the input to SybilSCAR. The performance of
this adapted SybilSCAR highly depends on the label noise of the training set.
3) SybilRank and SybilBelief with labeled training set. SybilRank [7]
and SybilBelief [14] are state-of-the-art random walk-based method and LBP-
based method, respectively. SybilRank can only leverage labeled benign nodes,
while SybilBelief can leverage both labeled benign nodes and labeled Sybils. We
randomly sample a labeled training set, where the number of labeled benign
nodes and Sybils equals n (the sampling size of SybilBlind).
4) SybilBlind. In the Facebook network with synthesized Sybils, our sam-
pler samples the two subsets B and S uniformly at random from the entire social
network. For the Twitter datasets, directly sampling two subsets B and S with
a low label noise is challenging due to the number of benign nodes is far larger
than that of Sybils. Thus, we refine our sampler by using discriminative node
features. Previous studies [37,36] found that Sybils proactively follow a large
number of benign users in order to make more benign users follow them, but
only a small fraction of benign users will follow back. Therefore, we extract the
follow back rate (FBR) feature for each node in the Twitter datasets. Then we
rank all nodes according to their FBR features in an ascending order. Presum-
ably, some Sybils are ranked high and some benign nodes are ranked low in the
ranking list. Thus, we sample the subset B from the bottom-K nodes and sam-
ple the subset S from the top-K nodes. Consider the different sizes of the two
Twitter datasets, we set K = 1, 000 and K = 500, 000 in the small and large
Twitter datasets, respectively. This sampler is more likely to sample training
sets that have lower label noise, and thus it improves SybilBlind’s performance.
Note that when evaluating SybilSCAR-Adapt on the Twitter datasets, we also
use FBR-feature-refined sampler to sample a training set. As a comparison, we
also evaluate the method simply using the FBR feature and denote it as FBR.
Moreover, we evaluate SybilBlind with randomly sampled two subsets without
the FBR feature, which we denote as SybilBlind-Random.
Parameter settings: For SybilBlind, according to Theorem 1, the minimal
number of sampling trials kmin to generate a training set with label noise less
than or equal to τ is exponential with respect to n, and kmin would be very
large even with a modest n. However, through empirical evaluations, we found
that the number of sampling trials can be largely decreased when using the
FBR-feature-refined sampler. Therefore, we instead use the following heuristics
to set the parameters, with which SybilBlind has already obtained satisfying
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Fig. 4: AUCs of SybilBlind vs. (a) sampling size n
and (b) number of sampling trials k on the large
Twitter. We observe that SybilBlind achieves high
AUSs when n and k reach certain values.
Table 2: AUCs of the compared methods on the Twitter datasets.
Method Small Twitter Large Twitter
Louvain 0.54 0.50
SybilSCAR-Adapt 0.89 0.70
SybilRank 0.86 0.69
SybilBelief 0.98 0.78
FBR 0.60 0.51
SybilBlind-Random 0.82 0.65
SybilBlind 0.98 0.79
performance. Specifically, n = 10, k = 100, and κ = 10 for the Facebook network
with synthesized Sybils; n = 100, k = 20, and κ = 10 for the small Twitter; and
n = 100, 000, k = 20, and κ = 10 for the large Twitter. We use a smaller k for
Twitter datasets because FBR-feature-refined sampler is more likely to sample
training sets with smaller label noise. We use a larger sampling size n for the large
Twitter dataset because its size is much bigger than the other two datasets. We
will also explore the impact of parameters and the results are shown in Figure 4.
For other compared methods, we set parameters according to their authors.
For instance, we set θ = 0.4 for SybilSCAR. SybilRank requires early termi-
nation, and its number of iterations is suggested to be O(log |V |). For each
experiment, we repeat 10 times and compute the average AUC. We implement
SybilBlind in C++ using multithreading, and we obtain the publicly available
implementations for SybilSCAR (also in C++)3 and Louvain method4. We per-
form all our experiments on a Linux machine with 512GB memory and 32 cores.
6.2 Results
AUCs of the compared methods: Figure 3 shows AUCs of the compared
methods on the Facebook network with synthesized Sybils as we increase the
3 http://home.engineering.iastate.edu/~neilgong/dataset.html
4 https://sites.google.com/site/findcommunities/
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Fig. 5: AUCs of SybilSCAR vs. the fraction of nodes that are manually labeled
as a training set on the small Twitter and large Twitter datasets. We observe
that SybilSCAR requires manually labeling about 25% and 2.8% of total nodes
on the small Twitter and large Twitter datasets to be comparable to SybilBlind.
number of attack edges. Note that SybilBlind-Random is essentially SybilBlind
in this case, as we randomly sample the subsets without the FBR feature. Ta-
ble 2 shows AUCs of the compared methods for the Twitter datasets with real
Sybils. We observe that 1) SybilBlind outperforms Louvain method. Specifically,
when the number of attack edges gets relatively large, even if one could design an
algorithm to label communities such that Louvain method can detect as many
Sybils as SybilBlind (i.e., similar false negative rates), Louvain method will rank
a large fraction of benign users higher than Sybils, resulting in small AUCs. The
reason is that some communities include a large number of both benign users
and Sybils, which is an intrinsic limitation of community detection. 2) SybilBlind
outperforms SybilSCAR-Adapt, which validates that our homophily-entropy ag-
gregator is significant and essential. Thus, aggregating results in multiple sam-
pling trials can boost the performance. 3) SybilBlind outperforms SybilRank
and is comparable with SybilBelief, even if SybilRank and SybilBelief use a
labeled training dataset. This is because the FBR-feature-refined sampler can
sample training sets with relatively small label noise and SybilSCAR is robust
to such label noise. As SybilSCAR was shown to outperform SybilRank and
be comparable with SybilBelief [30], so does SybilBlind. 4) SybilSCAR-Adapt
achieves AUCs that are close to random guessing on the Facebook network. This
is because the sampled training set has random label noise that could be large.
SybilSCAR-Adapt works better on the Twitter datasets. Again, this is because
the FBR feature assists our sampler to obtain the training sets with small la-
bel noise on the Twitter datasets and SybilSCAR can tolerate such label noise.
5) FBR achieves a small AUC. This indicates that although the FBR feature
can be used to generate a ranking list with small label noise by treating top-
ranked nodes as Sybils and bottom-ranked nodes as benign, the overall ranking
performance on the entire nodes is not promising. 6) SybilBlind-Random’s per-
formance decreases on the Twitter datasets. The reason is that it is difficult to
sample training sets with small label noise, as the number of benign nodes is far
larger than the number of Sybils on the Twitter datasets.
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Fig. 7: Impact of the fraction of
Sybils on the Facebook network. We
observe that SybilBlind can accu-
rately detect Sybils once the fraction
of Sybils is smaller than 50%, i.e.,
Sybils are less than benign nodes.
Number of manual labels SybilSCAR requires to match SybilBlind’s
performance: Intuitively, given a large enough manually labeled training set,
SybilSCAR that takes the manually labeled training set as an input would out-
perform SybilBlind. Therefore, one natural question is how many nodes need to
be manually labeled in order for SybilSCAR to match SybilBlind’s performance.
To answer this question, we respectively sample x fraction of total nodes in the
small Twitter dataset and large Twitter dataset and treat them as a manually
labeled training set, i.e., the benign nodes are assigned a label of benign and
the Sybils are assigned a label of Sybil. Note that the manually labeled training
set has no label noise. Then, we run SybilSCAR with the training set, rank the
remaining nodes using their probabilities of being Sybil, and compute an AUC.
Figure 5 shows the AUCs of SybilSCAR as we increase x from 0.1% to 3% on
the small Twitter and large Twitter datasets. For comparison, we also show the
AUC of SybilBlind on the small Twitter and large Twitter datasets, which is
a straight line since it does not rely on the manually labeled training set. We
observe that SybilSCAR requires manually labeling about 25% of total nodes on
the small Twitter and about 2.8% of total nodes on the large Twitter in order
to achieve an AUC that is comparable to SybilBlind.
Comparing different aggregators: Figure 6 shows the performances of differ-
ent aggregators on the Facebook network with synthesized Sybils as we increase
the number of attack edges. We observe that our homophily-entropy aggregator
(HEA) significantly outperforms the average, min, and max aggregators. The
average aggregator achieves performances that are close to random guessing.
This is because the average aggregator assigns an expected aggregated probabil-
ity of 0.5 to every node. Moreover, the min aggregator achieves AUCs that are
worse than random guessing, while the max aggregator achieves AUCs that are
slightly higher than random guessing. It is an interesting future work to theo-
retically understand the performance gaps for the min and max aggregators.
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Impact of the fraction of Sybils: Figure 7 shows the AUCs of SybilBlind
as the social network has more and more Sybils. We performed the experiments
on the Facebook network with synthesized Sybils since we need social networks
with different number of Sybils. The number of attack edges is set to be 500. We
observe that SybilBlind can accurately detect Sybils (AUCs are close to 1) once
the fraction of Sybils is smaller than 50%, i.e., Sybils are less than benign nodes.
We note that when Sybils are more than benign nodes, SybilBlind would rank
benign nodes higher than Sybils, resulting in AUCs that are close to 0. However,
in practice, Sybils are less than benign nodes, as we discussed in Section 3.2.
Impact of n and k: Figure 4a and 4b show AUCs of SybilBlind vs. sampling
size n (k = 20) and the number of sampling trials k (n = 100, 000) on the large
Twitter, respectively. We observe that the AUCs increase as the sampling size
and the number of sampling trials increase. The AUCs become stable after n
and k reach certain values. The AUCs are small when n or k is small, because
it is harder to sample training sets with relatively small label noise.
Running time: We show running time of SybilBlind on the large Twitter. We
concurrently generate sampling trials using multiprocessing. In particular, we
create 4 processes in parallel, each of which runs one sampling trial. Moreover,
each sampling trial runs SybilSCAR using multithreading (20 threads in our
experiments). It took about 2 hours for one process to run SybilSCAR in one
sampling trial, and the total time for our SybilBlind with 20 sampling trials is
around 10 hours.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We design a novel structure-based framework called SybilBlind to detect Sybils
in online social networks without a manually labeled training dataset. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of SybilBlind using both social networks with synthetic
Sybils and Twitter datasets with real Sybils. Our results show that Sybils can
be detected without manual labels. Future work includes applying SybilBlind to
detect Sybils with sampled subsets with different sizes and extending SybilBlind
to learn general machine learning classifiers without manual labels.
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A Performance of the Average Aggregator
Theorem 2. When SybilBlind uses the average aggregator, the expected aggre-
gated probability is 0.5 for every node.
Proof. Suppose in some sampling trial, the sampled subsets are B and S, and
SybilSCAR halts after T iterations. We denote by qu the prior probability and by
pu
(t) the probability in the tth iteration for u, respectively. Note that the subsets
B′ = S and S′ = B are sampled by the sampler with the same probability. We
denote by q′u the prior probability and by pu
(t)′ the probability in the tth iteration
for u, respectively, when SybilSCAR uses the subsets B′ and S′. We prove that
q′u = 1− qu and p(t)
′
u = 1− p(t)u for every node u and iteration t. First, we have:
q′u =

0.5− θ = 1− qu if u ∈ S
0.5 + θ = 1− qu if u ∈ B
0.5 = 1− qu otherwise,
which means that qu
′ = 1− qu for every node.
We have pu
(0)′ = qu
′ and pu(0) = qu. Therefore, p
(0)′
u = 1 − p(0)u holds for
every node in the 0th iteration. We can also show that p
(t)′
u = 1 − p(t)u holds
for every node in the tth iteration if p
(t−1)′
u = 1 − p(t−1)u holds for every node.
Therefore, p
(t)′
u = 1 − p(t)u holds for every node u and iteration t. As a result,
with the sampled subsets B′ and S′, SybilSCAR also halts after T iterations.
Moreover, the average probability in the two sampling trials (i.e., the sampled
subsets are B and S, and B′ = S and S′ = B) is 0.5 for every node. For each pair
of sampled subsets B and S, there is a pair of subsets B′ = S and S′ = B that
are sampled by our sampler with the same probability. Therefore, the expected
aggregated probability is 0.5 for every node.
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B Proof of Theorem 1
Lower bound: We have:
Pr(αb ≤ τ, αs ≤ τ) ≥ Pr(αb = αs = 0) = (1− r)nrn. (4)
We note that this lower bound is very loose because we simply ignore the
cases where Pr(0 < αb ≤ τ, 0 < αs ≤ τ). However, this lower bound is sufficient
to give us qualitative understanding.
Upper bound: We observe that the probability that label noise in both the
benign region and the Sybil region are no bigger than τ is bounded by the
probability that label noise in the benign region or the Sybil region is no bigger
than τ . Formally, we have:
Pr(αb ≤ τ, αs ≤ τ) ≤ min{Pr(αb ≤ τ),Pr(αs ≤ τ)} (5)
Next, we will bound the probabilities Pr(αb ≤ τ) and Pr(αs ≤ τ) separately.
We will take Pr(αb ≤ τ) as an example to show the derivations, and similar
derivations can be used to bound Pr(αs ≤ τ).
We observe the following equivalent equations:
Pr(αb ≤ τ) = Pr( nsb
nsb + nbb
≤ τ) = Pr(τnbb + (τ − 1)nsb ≥ 0) (6)
We define n random variablesX1, X2, · · · , Xn and n random variables Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn
as follows:
Xi =
{
τ if the ith node in B is benign
0 otherwise
Yi =
{
τ − 1 if the ith node in S is benign
0 otherwise,
where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. According to our definitions, we have Pr(Xi = τ) = 1− r
and Pr(Yi = τ − 1) = 1− r, where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Moreover, we denote S as the
sum of these random variables, i.e., S =
∑n
i=1Xi+
∑n
i=1 Yi. Then, the expected
value of S is E(S) = −(1− 2τ)(1− r)n. With the variables S and E(S), we can
further rewrite Equation 6 as follows:
Pr(αb ≤ τ) = Pr(S − E(S) ≥ −E(S))
According to Hoeffding’s inequality [17], we have
Pr(S − E(S) ≥ −E(S)) ≤ exp
(
− 2E
2(s)
(τ2 + (1− τ)2)n
)
= exp
(
− 2(1− 2τ)
2(1− r)2n
τ2 + (1− τ)2
)
Similarly, we can derive an upper bound of Pr(αs ≤ τ) as follows:
Pr(αs ≤ τ) ≤ exp
(
− 2(1− 2τ)
2r2n
τ2 + (1− τ)2
)
(7)
Since we consider r < 0.5 in this work, we have:
min{Pr(αb ≤ τ),Pr(αs ≤ τ)} = exp
(
− 2(1− 2τ)
2(1− r)2n
τ2 + (1− τ)2
)
(8)
By combining Equation 5 and Equation 8, we obtain Equation 3.
